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1. INTRODUCTION
As interest increases in the prospect that the unfair trade laws
could help domestic producers stem the rising tide of energy imports
into the United States, it is timely to make a close examination of en-
ergy-specific issues pertinent to future potential petitioners and of the
federal agencies responsible for investigating their allegations. Imported
downstream products, such as petrochemicals, and energy-intensive
products, such as aluminum and paper, have also received additional
scrutiny. This article surveys the principal issues that investigations of
energy imports raise under the antidumping and countervailing duty
laws,' Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,2 and Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930.' The article explores the impact that recent devel-
opments in Department of Commerce and International Trade Com-
mission practice, recent judicial decisions, the United States-Canada
Free-Trade Agreement," and the major provisions of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988' might have on such
investigations.
1.1. Two-Tiered Pricing of Energy Resources
Much of the concern over energy and downstream product imports
arises because several of our major trading partners maintain two-
* Chief Counsel for Import Administration, Office of the General Counsel,
United States Department of Commerce.
** Senior Counsel, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, United
States Department of Commerce.
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of its authors and do not neces-
sarily represent the position of the United States government or any of its agencies.
1 See infra Parts 2 & 3.
2 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982). See infra Part 6.
3 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). See infra Part 7.
" The United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, done Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2,
1988, 27 I.L.M. 281, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 113
(1988) [hereinafter Free-Trade Agreement].
" Omnibus Trade and Competiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-3111) [hereinafter 1988 Trade Act].
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tiered pricing schemes for energy resources, in which domestic prices
remain substantially lower than the world market price. For example,
Mexico maintains below-world-market domestic prices for natural gas,'
and Canada maintains below-world-market domestic prices for hydroe-
lectric power.' The low domestic prices arguably distort trade with the
United States for two reasons: (1) they enable such countries to sell
energy selectively to the United States at very low prices without
dumping, and (2) they substantially lower the production cost of deriv-
ative products, although (as discussed below) they are generally not
subsidies to such products under the countervailing duty law.
2. THE ANTIDUMPING LAW
United States antidumping law requires the imposition of an addi-
tional duty on products prior to their sale in this country if the imports
are priced below fair value-either their price in the home or third-
country markets or their fully allocated cost of production.8 The De-
partment of Commerce (Commerce) determines the degree of dumping
or "margin."' Antidumping duties are equal to the difference between
the foreign market value and U.S. prices or the amount by which the
U.S. import price undercuts the fully allocated cost of the product.10 A
U.S. industry that makes a product like the investigated import must
also demonstrate injury by the dumped imports prior to the imposition
of antidumping duties.11 The International Trade Commission, an in-
dependent federal agency, addresses the question of injury to the do-
mestic industry.
1 2
Petroleum, its downstream chemical products, and electricity are
the most important energy products imported by the United States. As
' Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 726 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985),
appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986), vacated in part, No. 86-09-01109,
87-71 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 20, 1986) [hereinafter Cabot I]. Further proceedings have
challenged the determinations of the Court of International Trade. See infra notes 72-
75.
7 See H. LEE, N. FOSTER & E. PARSON, CANADIAN ELECTRICITY IMPORTS: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PLICATIONS i-vi (Kennedy School of Government Energy and Environmental Policy
Center Discussion Paper Series, Apr. 1988); T. CONNELL, CANADA-U.S. ELECTRIC-
ITY TRADE: A SURVEY OF CURRENT TRENDS, COSTS, BENEFITS, AND ISSUES ES2
(Edison Electric Institute Power Supply Policy Division, Mar. 1988); M. Rothman,
Free Trade and Electricity, Remarks to ICEED Conference on Energy Supply and
Trade Policies: Balancing National and Global Imperatives (Apr. 8, 1988).
8 See Tariff Act of 1930 § 731, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
9 See Tariff Act of 1930 § 731, 19 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(1)(A) (1982).
10 See Tariff Act of 1930 § 731, 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(2) (1982).
11 See Tariff Act of 1930 § 731, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
12 Id.
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discussed above, a principal feature of the world market for these prod-
ucts is a two-tiered pricing system, in which producing countries main-
tain domestic prices substantially below world-market export prices.
Selling at a higher price in the United States than in the home market
is the opposite of dumping. This leaves sales priced below the pro-
ducer's cost of production as the only potential source of dumping.1"
It is also unlikely that petroleum or petroleum products are being
sold in the United States for less than their cost of production. The
world price of petroleum is low in comparison with recent years, yet it
is still high by historical levels, and there is no indication that costs
have risen commensurately. It is equally unlikely that refinery products
are being sold below cost, because inexpensive domestic petroleum re-
sults in low production costs for refinery products. That may not be
true of highly refined downstream products, because inexpensive crude
would be a less significant factor in their total production costs.
A below-cost-of-production investigation of downstream petroleum
products could in theory lead to a dumping finding if government pro-
vision of cheap crude oil were considered a subsidy and Commerce in-
cluded the amount of that subsidy in the producer's cost of production.
In 1986, the Court of International Trade (CIT) held that such subsi-
dies were to be investigated under the countervailing duty law and may
not be taken into account under the antidumping law."'
Given all of these factors, the antidumping law is an unlikely
source of relief for free-world producers claiming injury from two-
tiered pricing systems of petroleum and other energy products.
2.1. Exports from Non-market Economies
Dumping investigations in non-market economy countries
(NMEs) such as the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union
present a different set of problems. The antidumping law recognizes
that domestic prices in such countries are not suitable points of compar-
ison for United States prices because domestic prices in NMEs are not
" Section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. 1987),
provides that anti-dumping duties shall be imposed "in an amount equal to the amount
by which the foreign market value exceeds the United States price for the merchan-
dise." To determine "foreign market value," Section 773(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982), permits Commerce in certain circumstances to disregard
sales made below the cost of production and, if the remaining sales are an inadequate
basis for determining foreign market value, to base foreign market value on the con-
structed value of the merchandise.
" Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 1421, 1430 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1986).
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set by market forces.1 5 Accordingly, in dumping investigations of
NMEs, the statute directs Commerce to locate a free-market country
with an economy at a stage of economic development comparable to the
NME being investigated and to use costs in that country to determine
foreign market value.1"
The preferred approach for employing surrogate country data is to
construct a foreign market value by quantifying the raw materials, la-
bor, and other factors of production used to produce the exported mer-
chandise in the NME, then obtain corresponding values for those fac-
tors from the surrogate country.' 7 Standard percentages are added to
the total to cover general expenses and profit. 8 Commerce may base
foreign market value on the price at which like products from free-
market countries with comparable economies are sold in other coun-
tries, including the United States if Commerce cannot obtain adequate
information to employ the factors-of-production approach. 9
The factors-of-production approach preferred by the Omnibus and
Competitiveness Trade Act of 198820 (1988 Trade Act) should elimi-
nate some of the lottery aspects of previous approaches to using data
from surrogate producers. Before the 1988 revisions, Commerce first
looked to prices for the subject merchandise in the home (or third-coun-
try) markets of the surrogate producer and, absent such information,
constructed the value of the merchandise in the surrogate country."
Having little or no incentive to cooperate, potential surrogate producers
often refused to furnish Commerce with the requested, highly sensitive,
price and cost information. In contrast, much of the information needed
under the factors methodology, such as labor rates, raw material costs,
and property depreciation rates, should be available from public
'5 See Tariff Act of 1930 § 773(c), 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982).
18 Id. This provision was substantially revised by section 1316 of the Omnibus
Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1186 (1988).
1 Section 773(c)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (1982),
provides that if the merchandise under investigation is exported from a nonmarket
economy country, and Commerce finds that available information does not permit the
foreign market value of the merchandise to be determined under subsection (a), that is,
on the basis of home market prices, Commerce shall determine the foreign market value
of the merchandise on the basis of the value of the factors of production utilized in
producing the merchandise.
18 Tariff Act of 1930 § 773(e), 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
18 Tariff Act of 1930 § 773(c)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(2) (1982). Because the
new approach contains a fallback method which employs information from the United
States, it would also enable Commerce to make at least some estimate of foreign market
value in all cases according to standards clearly set out in the statute, as opposed to
assembling ad hoe the best information otherwise available.
20 1988 Trade Act § 1316, 102 Stat. 1186.
21 See H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 590 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1623.
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sources.
In a case involving oil, for example, the various factors of produc-
tion consumed in producing the oil would be tabulated in the NME
and then valued in a country with an economy at a comparable stage of
development. The cost of production of oil worldwide presently appears
to be well below its world market price. It follows logically that the
constructed foreign market value for oil would be below the world mar-
ket price charged in the United States, resulting in a finding of no
dumping.
Such assumptions often are unreliable in NME cases involving en-
ergy products, given the inherent uncertainties of the factors-of-produc-
tion method. First, it is difficult to predict which surrogate country will
be chosen, although certainty may increase as Commerce gains experi-
ence under the new law. In addition, the search is more challenging
due to Congress' prescription that Commerce use data based on techno-
logical and volume production levels similar to those of the investigated
producers.2 2 Due to these considerations, there is no foolproof method
for NME producers to set their prices in the United States to avoid
dumping. U.S. petitioners would have similar difficulties anticipating
the outcome of cases involving NME producers.
2.2. Input Dumping by Related Parties
Another provision of the 1988 Trade Act may affect energy im-
ports.23 The new provision applies where a major input to the exported
product is obtained from a related party and Commerce has reasonable
grounds to believe that the nominal price of that input was less than its
cost of production. The provision enables Commerce to disregard the
nominal price paid by producers to related entities for inputs in such
cases and to substitute its own best information as to the cost of the
inputs.24 For example, Commerce could disregard the price paid by a
22 See H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 591 (1988).
23 1988 Trade Act § 1318, 102 Stat. 1189 (adding § 773(e)(3) to the Tariff Act of
1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(3) (1982)).
24 While there is no explicit provision for this procedure under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 27 U.N.T.S. 19
[hereinafter GATT], it is implicit in the provision of that agreement, and of the An-
tidumping Code, infra, permitting foreign market value to be calculated on the basis of
the cost of production. See GATT art. VI(1)(b)(ii), 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1948). Article
2(4) of Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (Relating to Antidumping Measures), Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919,
4925, T.I.A.S. No. 9650 [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Code], provides for the calculation
of foreign market value on the basis of the cost of production when "the particular
market situation" does not permit a proper comparison of prices. Article 2(4) thus
anticipates that the production costs being sought are those in the country of origin of
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chemical manufacturer to its petroleum-producing parent for feed-
stocks. This would be unlikely to affect cases involving energy products,
however, because arm's-length prices for energy products in major en-
ergy-producing countries tend to be low.
3. THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
Another important law administered by Commerce is the counter-
vailing duty law, which provides for the imposition of duties to offset
foreign government subsidies supporting the production or export of
products exported to the United States.25 Benefits paid on export are
(with certain limited exceptions) subsidies per se, while benefits
granted to domestic producers regardless of export are subsidies in cer-
tain circumstances, described below.
26
3.1. Preliminary Observations
Several preliminary observations should be made about potential
investigations of energy imports under the countervailing duty law.
First, the countervailing duty law does not apply to imports from
NMEs such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.2
Accordingly, Commerce would not accept a countervailing duty petition
against energy imports from a NME country.
Second, countervailing duty petitions, like antidumping petitions,
are accepted only from parties that manufacture a product in the
United States that is "like" the imported product.' It is improbable
the merchandise under investigation.
It would be anomalous for GATT to permit antidumping authorities to disregard
the foreign market price of an exported good in favor of the cost of production of that
good, yet force Commerce to accept the nominal price paid to a related party for a
major component of the exported good.
25 Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 701-709, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671f (1982 & Supp. 1987).
2 See Tariff Act of 1930 § 771(5), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
27 Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The
basic reasoning of Georgetown was that, in countries where the entire economy is con-
trolled by the government, it would be arbitrary to classify particular government pro-
grams as subsidies, or to place a precise value on the benefits provided under particular
programs.
An amendment to the countervailing duty law that would have overturned Ge-
orgetown in part by requiring Commerce to measure subsidies in nonmarket economies
to the extent "reasonably possible" was introduced in the House but not included in the
final 1988 trade bill. H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 628 (1988).
28 Tariff Act of 1930 § 702, 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987), pro-
vides that a countervailing duty proceeding shall be commenced whenever an interested
party files a petition with Commerce. Tariff Act of 1930 § 771(9), 19 U.S.C.
1677(9)(C) (1982), defines an interested party as one who manufactures a "like prod-
uct." See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 529 F. Supp. 664, 667 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1981) (strictly applying the Tariff Act's statutory definition of interested
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that different forms of energy would be found to be "like products." It
is therefore doubtful that a producer of one form of energy, such as coal
or petroleum, would be successful in filing a countervailing duty peti-
tion (or, for that matter, an antidumping petition)"9 against imports of
another form of energy, such as uranium or electricity.3"
Third, in contrast to the requirements of the antidumping law, no
injury determination would be required in some cases. Only countries
that have signed the GATT Subsidies Code31 (or a substantially similar
bilateral agreement with the United States) are entitled to an injury test
for dutiable products, including all forms of energy. 2 This excludes
most of the major petroleum-producing and -exporting countries, al-
though it includes Canada, Mexico, and European Community mem-
ber states. 3 Future petitioners will enjoy a substantial head start in
obtaining a countervailing duty order if they are not required to prove
parties).
2 Tariff Act of 1930 § 732, 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987), on
antidumping duty investigations, contains threshold requirements that essentially paral-
lel those of Tariff Act of 1930 § 702, 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b), involving countervailing
duty investigations.
31 The Senate Finance Committee made this clear during its consideration of a
provision in the proposed United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementa-
tion Act of 1988, enacted Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1989), which would
have permitted industries that are especially vulnerable to Canadian subsidies to be
identified:
Furthermore, the standing requirements to file a request under this sub-
section are similar to the requirements under the countervailing duty law.
The Committee does not intend that industries be identified because they
compete with imports derived from subsidized products. For example, the
coal industry could not request to be identified because of increased com-
petition from imports of electricity.
S. REP. No. 509, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2395, 2438. The point was raised by Senator Moynihan of New York,
whose state benefits from imports of low-priced Canadian electricity.
Even if it were possible for a petitioner in a countervailing duty case to bring a
case against a product as broadly defined as "energy," the resulting breadth of the
"domestic industry" would probably make it impossible to obtain an affirmative injury
determination where one is required prior to the imposition of countervailing duties.
31 Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Relating to Subsidies and Countervailing Measures),
Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
32 See Tariff Act of 1930 § 701(a)(1)(A), 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1)(A) (1982 &
Supp. 1987), which refers to a "country under the Agreement." The issue of whether
signing GATT or a substantially similar bilateral agreement with the United States
entitles a country to injury tests for all unliquidated entries of its products (including
those previously entered), or only for products entered after they sign is currently
before the International Trade Administration. See Cementos Anahuac del Golfo v.
United States, 689 F. Supp. 1191 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Cementos Guadalajara v.
United States, 686 F. Supp. 335 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (which raise but leave the issue
undecided).
s3 See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 366 (1988).
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injury.
Fourth, pricing exports to the United States to recoup domestic
subsidies may not preclude them from being countervailed. The coun-
tervailing duty law is restricted to attempts to identify and value subsi-
dies. It does not take account of the producers' ultimate rate of return
on the subsidized product, except in very limited circumstances.34
3.2. The Major Substantive Issues under the Countervailing Duty
Law
Two basic facts have to be established in order to prove that en-
ergy products or their derivatives benefit from domestic, as opposed to
export 5 subsidies. First, it must be shown that a government program
benefits a specific set of recipients-that the program benefits a specific
company, industry, or industrial sector."6 Second, it must be shown that
the government program in question is preferential-providing the spe-
cific recipients. either with goods or services at prices more favorable
than those commonly available in that country or with funds on terms
inconsistent with commercial considerations. 37 Each of these two tests,
discussed separately below, has evolved in recent years.
3.2.1. Specificity
The countervailing duty law defines subsidies as benefits that are
provided by a government to "a specific enterprise or industry, or
group of enterprises or industries."3 The specificity test attempts to
3' See Tariff Act of 1930 § 771(6), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (1982), which provides
that Commerce may subtract from the gross subsidy the amount of any "export taxes,
duties, or other charges levied on the export of merchandise to the United States specifi-
cally intended to offset the subsidy received." It is not clear that the existence of a
higher export price which recoups the subsidy on exports, rather than passing it
through to the customer, would qualify under this provision.
35 Export subsidies are bestowed by reason of the export of particular products.
For example, a foreign government could pay the producer of a particular product one
dollar for each item exported. By definition, this program would be a benefit to a
specific entity: the exporter of the goods. Domestic subsidies are paid regardless of
whether the product they benefit is exported and may or may not assist specific firms or
industries. See generally J. BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE & IN-
VESTMENT 351-81 (1986).
38 See Tariff Act of 1930 § 771(5), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(ii) (1982).
37 Id.
38 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982). Prior to 1980, the Department of the Treasury
interpreted Section 1303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, which still governs countervailing
duty proceedings involving products from countries which have not signed the GATT
Subsidies Code, as implicitly containing a specificity test. The specificity test was for-
mally incorporated in the Tariff Act of 1930 § 771(5), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982), by
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 177 (1979).
[Vol. 11:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol11/iss2/4
INT'L ENERGY TRADE & UNFAIR TRADE LAWS
distinguish between those domestic programs of foreign governments
that substantially promote the production of specific products and those
that favor production generally. 9 This distinction theoretically allows
protection of U.S. producers from those products which have benefited
from substantial government promotion while protecting acts of foreign
governments, such as providing schools and telephones and establishing
tax rates, from countervailing duties. 0
In recent years there has been a fundamental dispute about the
validity of the Commerce's specificity test for domestic subsidies. 1 Gov-
ernment sales of energy products at prices below world-market levels
have been at the heart of that controversy for several reasons. First,
although low-priced energy may nominally be available to all producers
in a particular country, it may in practice be used only by specific pro-
ducers. Second, some producers or industries may benefit significantly
more than others even if inexpensive energy is used by all producers in
a foreign country. Two examples are manufacturers of energy-intensive
products, such as paper and aluminum, and manufacturers of down-
stream products, such as petrochemicals. Finally, even within particular
industries where the various producers are receiving exactly the same
benefit, subsidized energy still gives each exporting producer an advan-
tage over its U.S. competitors.
Domestic producers have suggested a remedy for each of these
problems. First, they have urged Commerce to identify the actual, as
opposed to the nominal, distribution of benefits under particular pro-
grams and to treat as subsidies all programs which benefit specific en-
39 This goal has been criticized as impossible to achieve in practice. See Tarullo,
Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARV. L. Rav. 546,
561 (1987) ("Commerce Department efforts to deal with this problem have led to sub-
stantial and inevitable arbitrariness in administering the law. . . . Commerce tends to
exonerate programs that are in form 'generally available,' even when they seem to con-
centrate substantive benefits in one or a few industries.").
40 To the extent that the specificity test is based on an underlying economic the-
ory, rather than considerations of international politics, the theory is that government
programs that promote production generally in a foreign economy have an impact on
exports of particular products to the United States that is too small to be of concern
under the unfair trade laws.
In addition, broad economic measures ultimately may be balanced by their effect
on exchange rates. For example, the provision of all raw materials at subsidized rates
in a particular country would lower production costs generally and tend to increase
exports. In the long run, however, this would also tend to strengthen that country's
currency, which would tend to lower exports and raise imports. Accordingly, economy-
wide subsidies may not increase exports. On the other hand, specific programs, such as
the provision of subsidized raw materials for the production of a particular product,
may not affect exchange rates and, consequently, may increase exports of the targeted
product in the long run.
41 As noted above, benefits tied in one way or another to the export of particular
goods-that is, export subsidies-are inherently specific.
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terprises or industries in practice."2 This has been called the "de facto
benefit" or "use" test. Second, in cases where benefits are in fact dis-
tributed to a broad range of industries, petitioners have urged Com-
merce to identify the users who profit disproportionately and to treat
the benefits as subsidies to those producers.43 This might be called the
"impact" test. Third, in instances where governments provide inputs
(especially natural resources) to exported products at below-world-mar-
ket prices, petitioners have urged Commerce to abandon the specificity
test and to treat the differential between the home and world-market
prices of the input as a subsidy per se."' This has been called the "com-
petitive advantage" test. It is an exception to the specificity test for in-
puts priced below world-market levels.
Of these three proposed tests, the "use" test is consistent with
long-standing Commerce practice and has been accepted by Depart-
ment.45 The remaining two tests represent radical departures from
Commerce's accepted practice. The "impact" test would continue to fo-
cus on the distribution of benefits in the foreign economy. Yet this test
attempts to raise that analysis to a level of sophistication which is prob-
ably impractical, given the time constraints within which Commerce
must complete countervailing duty investigations.46 The "competitive
advantage" test would obviate an examination of distribution in prac-
tice (or even of impact) in cases involving inputs priced below world
market levels. The test would substitute a comparison of the relative
prices paid by foreign and U.S. producers for those inputs. A brief sur-
vey of these developments is set forth below.
42 See infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Can-Am Corp. v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 1444, 1447-49 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1987).
"' See Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 733 n.9 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985); Can-Am, 664 F. Supp. at 1448.
" To a substantial extent, Commerce has always considered the actual, as well as
nomipal, impact of foreign government programs. See, e.g., Certain Steel Products
From the Federal Republic of Germany, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,345, 39,351 '(Dep't Comm.
1982) (final countervailing duty determination):
We verified that ERP [European Recovery Program] funds are disbursed
to all branches of industry and that no specific industry, group of indus-
tries or industries in particular regions is the main beneficiary of these
funds. Therefore, we have determined that this program does not confer
benefits which constitute subsidies. . . . Information developed during the
verification indicates that this institution makes loans available without
regard to specific industries or regions. Therefore, we do not find benefits
it may confer to be subsidies on the products under investigation.
Id.
Normally, countervailing duty investigations must be completed within one year
after the petition is filed. See Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 703, 705, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(b),
1671(d) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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The first general attack on the specificity test was brought in Car-
lisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States.47 In Carlisle, the Court of
International Trade held that two accelerated depreciation programs
under Korean tax law were not countervailable subsidies because they
were generally available to the entire business community of Korea.48
The court accepted Commerce's arguments that rejection of the speci-
ficity test would lead to an absurdly broad definition of subsidies, ren-
dering their measurement extremely difficult and creating an over-
whelming administrative burden.4"
The broad approval which the CIT accorded the specificity test in
Carlisle was short-lived. The following year, the court retreated from
its prior position in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States.50 Bethle-
hem Steel arose from a final determination on steel from South Africa51
and centered on the South African government's practice of permitting
South African companies to deduct from their taxable income two hun-
dred percent of the cost of certain employee training programs. Com-
merce determined that the program was not a subsidy because the de-
ductions were available to all South African industries. 5 The CIT
agreed that the program was not a subsidy, but the court explicitly
refused to embrace Commerce's rationale. Instead, the court affirmed
the administrative determination below "solely on the ground that the
practice in question was a tax law, and tax laws are not subsidies to the
taxpayer if their terms are generally available." '54
"' Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1983). Although Carlisle involved a Commerce determination under Section
1303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the court noted that "Congress specifically provided
that the new statutory term 'subsidy' has the same meaning as the term 'bounty or
grant' found in Section 1303." Id. at 839 (citing Tariff Act of 1930 § 771(5), codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (Supp. IV 1980) (current version at 19 U.S.C. §
1677(5) (1982))).
48 Id. at 836.
49 Id. at 838.
5 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984). See also Agrexco Agricultural Export Co. v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 1238,
1242 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
" See Certain Steel Products from South Africa, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,379 (1982) (fi-
nal determination and countervailing duty order).
82 Bethlehem Steel, 590 F. Supp. at 1239.
88 Id.
84 Id. The court explicitly rejected "the broader rationale that, as a rule, generally
available benefits are not subsidies." Id. at 1239. It found that the term "specific" was
"simply one of the phrases used to insure that the listed government subsidies are cov-
ered in the widest possible range of circumstances." Id. at 1241. In effect, the court
found that the word "specific" in the statute modifies only the words "enterprise or
industry" and not "group of enterprises or industries." The court explained that, in its
view, "Congress has covered the full range of possibilities, going from the subsidization
of a single unit to all larger units, up to and including the entire productive sector." Id.
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3.2.1.1. The Cabot Decisions
A Commerce determination that a foreign government program
was not a subsidy because it was generally available was reversed for
the first time in Cabot Corp. v. United States (Cabot I)." Cabot I in-
volved imports from Mexico of carbon black, a form of elemental car-
bon used in the manufacture of paints, rubber, plastics, and other prod-
ucts. Carbon black is made from "catcracker bottoms," the heavy
residue remaining at the bottom of petroleum refining towers after the
lighter elements have been distilled. Commerce declined to countervail
two Mexican government programs that supplied catcracker bottoms
and natural gas to two Mexican carbon black producers below world-
market prices, because it determined that those two commodities were
generally available at the same prices to any industry in Mexico.5"
The CIT reversed Commerce's determination in part in Cabot L
The court ruled that the Department had erred in focusing on the nom-
inal availability of catcracker bottoms and natural gas in Mexico,
rather than on whether those commodities were actually used only by
specific producers.57 The court then directed Commerce, if it deter-
at 1242. This interpretation effectively reads the term "specific" out of the statute.
Curiously, after going to some length to explain its comprehensive rejection of the
notion that "generally available" benefits were not subsidies, the court carved out an
exception for tax benefits. The court justified the exception as supported by certain
references in the legislative history and the conclusion that, because taxation was not a
subsidy, "equal opportunities to reduce the exaction" could not create a subsidy. Id. at
1244-45. In short, the court concluded that the "generally available" test may be ap-
plied to government actions that withhold a burden, but not to those which confer a
benefit.
This elevation of form over substance is unpersuasive. It would lead, for example,
to the conclusion that a foreign government could entirely exempt a specific company
from taxes without conferring a subsidy. Logically, the specificity of a benefit cannot
depend on whether its form is positive or negative. Such a distinction loses its meaning
in economies in which all companies are subject to taxation. In such economies, any
positive benefit can easily be transformed into a tax deduction or exemption. The
court's refusal to recognize this obvious point suggests that it was unwilling to follow
the logic of its rejection of the specificity test, which would have led to the conclusion
that the tax deductions in question (like virtually all government activity) were
countervailable subsidies.
" Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal
dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986), vacated in part, No. 86-09-01109, 87-71
(Ct. Int'l Trade Order, Nov. 20, 1986) [hereinafter Cabot I].
88 Carbon Black from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564, 29,566, 29,568-69 (1983)
(final determination and countervailing duty order).
"' The court noted that there were only two producers of carbon black in Mexico
and that they had specifically located their plants and geared their production processes
to use the catcracker bottoms produced by two Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) refin-
eries. Cabot I, 620 F. Supp. at 727, 733 n.9. It then pointed out that "[t]he record [did]
not show what happens to the catcracker bottoms from the remaining seven refineries
and whether these bottoms are suitable for carbon black feedstock." Id. at 728. Thus,
the court appeared to be concerned that PEMEX might have been able to sell the
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mined that there was a "bestowal upon a specific class," to determine
whether the bestowal amounted to a "competitive advantage."58
There has been considerable dispute about the meaning of the
CIT's second direction in Cabot L Commerce evidently understood the
direction as establishing a criterion by which to measure the preferen-
tiality of the benefit bestowed by the inputs from the Mexican govern-
ment's oil monopoly, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) if it were estab-
lished that these inputs specifically benefited the carbon black
producers.59 Others have contended that the second instruction of
Cabot I required Commerce to treat the difference between the price
paid by the Mexican carbon black producers and the world-market
price for natural gas as a subsidy per se and automatically to counter-
vail that amount.
There are two critical points to note regarding the latter, expan-
sive interpretation. First, it was explicitly rejected by the CIT: "Plain-
tiff argues that a price below the world market price is a per se
countervailable benefit. The matter is more complex. The availability
of inputs at low prices to foreign producers may be the result of various
non-countervailable factors such as comparative advantage."60
Second, if the difference between the home and world-market price
of government-supplied inputs is a countervailable subsidy per se, then
it does not matter whether those inputs were actually used by only one
producer or by every company in Mexico. The inputs would be subsi-
dies per se, either way. Although the CIT's principal concern in Cabot
I was to require Commerce to conduct a de facto test of the use of
natural gas and catcracker bottoms in Mexico, 1 the expansive interpre-
tation would render the results of that test irrelevant. Petitioner's argu-
ment, broadly stated, would partially repeal the specificity test. The
catcracker bottoms provided to the carbon black producers to some other industry in
Mexico at higher prices.
5 Id. at 732, 734.
" Because Commerce did not find that natural gas was provided specifically to
the carbon black producers, it did not need to address the preferentiality issue with
respect to a commodity with a world-market price. See Carbon Black from Mexico, 51
Fed. Reg. 13,269, 13,271 (1986) (preliminary administrative review). Commerce has
yet to address this issue in such a context.
6 Cabot I, 620 F. Supp. at 733 n.9. In the subsequent case of PPG Indus. v.
United States, 662 F. Supp. 258, 265 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), the same CIT judge
stated that Cabot I "held, moreover, that 'the appropriate standard focuses on the de
facto case by case effect of benefits provided to recipients rather than on the nominal
availability of benefits' (citations omitted)."
61 See, e.g., Cabot 1, 620 F. Supp. at 732 ("The appropriate standard focuses on
the de facto case by case effect of benefits provided to recipients rather than on the
nominal availability of benefits. The case must therefore be remanded for further inves-
tigation and redetermination.").
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court apparently intended a mere refinement.
As noted above, the CIT remanded the carbon black proceeding to
Commerce with instructions to determine whether the two programs
actually benefited specific recipients in Mexico. 2 Before the remand
was completed, Commerce completed an administrative review of the
countervailing duty order on carbon black from Mexico.63 Commerce's
determination provided a new deposit rate for carbon black,6' thus ren-
dering moot the surviving elements of the controversy concerning Com-
merce's original determination not to countervail the Mexican govern-
ment programs.65
In the administrative review, Commerce determined that the pro-
vision of natural gas to the two carbon black producers was not a spe-
cific benefit, because natural gas was generally available at the same
price to any industry in Mexico.66 The Department reversed its posi-
tion in the investigation with respect to carbon black feedstock and
found that, because it was used by only two producers, the feedstock
conferred a specific benefit.
6 7
The CIT overturned the results of this administrative review in
Cabot 1.68 The court found that Commerce had failed to apply the
principles enunciated in Cabot I in determining the specificity of low-
priced natural gas and catcracker bottoms and remanded the proceeding
62 Id. at 734.
6 Carbon Black from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,385 (1986) (final administrative
review).
64 Id. at 30,388.
6" Commerce investigations cover periods prior to the preliminary determinations
in those investigations. 19 C.F.R. § 353.38(a) (1989). The deposit rates they establish
are only estimated duties for entries. Definitive duties are determined by subsequent
administrative reviews. As a result, administrative reviews render moot the deposit rate
established by the investigation. See Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States, 696 F. Supp.
1525 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
6 Carbon Black from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269, 13,271 (1986) (preliminary
administrative review). The Department still holds that the price differential between
PEMEX's low domestic and high export prices of natural gas does not constitute a
domestic subsidy because the domestic prices are available to more than a specific group
of enterprises or industries.
"' Carbon Black from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,385, 30,386 (1986) (final admin-
istrative review). Commerce stated:
Although [carbon black feedstock] is theoretically available to all industries
in Mexico, there is in fact only one industrial use at present and only two
actual users. Therefore, we reaffirm our position in the preliminary re-
sults that there are too few users of [carbon black feedstock] for us to find
that it is provided on a generally-available basis.
Id.
6 Cabot v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 949 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) [hereinafter
Cabot I]. While noting that the order in Cabot I was vacated, the court endorsed the
legal reasoning and principle of Cabot L Id. at 955.
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to Commerce with instructions to redetermine their specificity in accor-
dance with Cabot I (which Cabot 11 largely incorporated).6 9
In this second remand, Commerce determined that natural gas was
not specifically provided to the carbon black producers, because it was
purchased by more than 3,700 Mexican enterprises at the official
price.y On the other hand, Commerce determined that catcracker bot-
toms were supplied specifically to the carbon black producers, because
they were sold exclusively to two companies.
7 1
3.2.1.2. The PPG Decision
The CIT addressed the specificity issue again in PPG Indus. v.
United States,7 2 a case that arose from a countervailing duty investiga-
tion of float glass from Mexico.7 ' Like Cabot I, PPG involved the pro-
vision of natural gas to float glass manufacturers at below-world-mar-
ket prices. The CIT agreed with Commerce that, in this case, the
provision of natural gas at below-world-market prices was not a sub-
sidy because evidence in the record indicated the float glass manufac-
turers "paid the published price for natural gas that was available to
all industries. 174 The court apparently relaxed the "use" test because
the price respondents paid for natural gas was from a published price
list and natural gas was available to all industries in Mexico at the
published price.
PPG also involved a trust fund established by the Mexican gov-
ernment to assist Mexican firms in paying foreign debts.7 5 Funds from
the trust were made available only to Mexican firms with registered
long-term debt in foreign currency payable abroad. 6 Commerce had
found the program not to be specific because it was not "targeted to a
specific industry or enterprise, group of industries or enterprises, or to
companies located in specific regions"77 of the country.
Once again, the court did not remand the case and direct Com-
69 Id. at 955-59.
70 Cabot Corp. v. United States, No. 86-09-01109, at 6-9 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov.
21, 1988) (reconsideration pursuant to remand).
71 Id. at 10-12.
7' PPG Indus. v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 258 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) [herein-
after PPG]. The decision is currently on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Because the Cabot I appeal was dismissed on other grounds, the PPG appeal
will present the first occasion for the Federal Circuit to rule on the specificity test.
" Unprocessed Float Glass from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 7,264 (1984) (suspension
of countervailing duty investigation).
"' PPG, 662 F. Supp. at 272.
15 Id. at 263-67 (FICORCA [Trust Fund for Coverage of Risks] program).
76 Id. at 263.
'" Unprocessed Float Glass from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,097, 23,099 (1984).
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merce to conduct the "use" specificity test, which would have entailed
compiling a list of the enterprises that actually received the Mexican
government loans, and then determining whether the class of recipients
was sufficiently broad that the benefit was not specific." Instead, the
court focused on the eligibility requirements of the program and con-
cluded that they did not de facto render the benefit one which is pro-
vided to a discrete class of beneficiaries.7 9
In sum, PPG represents a retreat from the "use" test for specific-
ity.8 O It suggests that use is pertinent only when there is no evidence
that the program in question is used by a broad class of enterprises or
industries. A more expansive reading of the decision would suggest that
use is relevant only when there is an affirmative indication that the
program in question is not used by a broad class of enterprises or in-
dustries. Either meaning limits the use test to special circumstances,
aligning the CIT's position with Commerce's more flexible view of the
specificity test."'
The domestic petitioners have appealed the CIT's application of
the specificity test in PPG to the Federal Circuit.82 This will be the
first time that the specificity issue has been presented to the Federal
Circuit, because Cabot I became moot before it could be appealed.8" If
78 As an illustration of the "use" test, the foreign debt assistance in PPG would
have presented a middle case between the two programs at issue in Cabot L It was
neither restricted to a few firms, as was the carbon black feedstock, nor used by virtu-
ally every sector of the economy, as was natural gas.
7' PPG, 662 F. Supp. at 266.
80 The court emphasized that "the mere fact that a program contains certain eligi-
bility requirements for participation does not transform the program into one which
has provided a countervailable benefit." Id.
81 See Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,169
(1983) (final negative determination) [hereinafter Softwood Products].
The CIT reinforced the Cabot I and PPG decisions in Can-Am Corp. v. United
States, 664 F. Supp. 1444 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). In Can-Am, the court sustained
Commerce's determination that the Mexican government's provision of fuel oil to Mex-
ican lime producers at a price below that offered to exporters of fuel oil was not a
subsidy. The court pointed out that the fuel oil program was very similar to the natural
gas program at issue in Cabot I, and ruled that the mere exclusion of exporters did not
render the program sector-specific. Can-Am, 664 F. Supp. at 1448.
In Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1206 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987), the CIT ruled that the right of a Spanish steel producer to extend repay-
ment of principal without interest on loans under the Spanish bankruptcy law was not
a countervailable subsidy. The Al Tech decision is significant because there was no
evidence on the record regarding the actual distribution of benefits under the Spanish
bankruptcy law. The CIT ruled that, in the absence of facts tending to establish the
existence of a discrete class of beneficiaries, Commerce was not required to look behind
the actions of the Spanish bankruptcy tribunal and investigate the distribution of those
benefits. Id. at 1213.
82 PPG Indus. v. United States, 662 F.Supp. 258 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), appeal
docketed, No. 86-12-01546 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
83 See Cabot I, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
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the Federal Circuit sustains the CIT's decision, then the specificity test
will stand as it has been described. On the other hand, should PPG be
reversed, a very broad range of government activity, so far treated by
Commerce as non-sector-specific, could become countervailable. In that
case, benefits bestowed in a period covered by a Commerce proceeding
initiated before August 23, 1988, could be countervailable8 4
3.2.1.3. Specificity and the 1988 Trade Act
Battle over the specificity test was waged anew in Congress during
hearings on the 1988 Trade Act. 5 The House of Representatives bill
proffered a streamlined definition of "subsidy" consistent with the ex-
isting statutory definition.86 The legislative history of the House provi-
sion contains some passages, however, that have been interpreted to im-
ply that the amendment intended to codify the self-contradictory
"competitive advantage" interpretation of Cabot I discussed above. 87
The Senate bill contained a different specificity provision, simply
84 Benefits bestowed in later periods will be covered by the amended definition of
"subsidy" in the 1988 Trade Act, supra note 5, which codifies the "use" test of Cabot I
and, by implication, the specificity test itself. See the discussion of the 1988 Trade Act,
infra notes 115-152 and accompanying text.
85 Pub. L. No. 109-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§
2901-3111).
6 H.R. 3, § 153, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The proposed amendment would
have removed the passage in the definition of a subsidy subject to U.S. countervailing
duties, which then read:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsis-
tent with commercial considerations;
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
and replaced it with the following passage:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, loan guarantees, goods, or services at
preferential rates or on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.
87 See H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1,
at 123-24 (1987). Again, the bulk of this passage consists of a description of the "use"
test which Cabot I ordered Commerce to perform on remand. Although the words
"competitive advantage" appear, they are immediately followed by a passage which,
like Cabot I, suggests that "competitive advantage" can be an issue only where the
specificity test has been satisfied:
There are, for example, instances where a government provides an input
product, such as a natural resource, to its industries in a manner that has
actually conferred benefits to a specific enterprise, industry, or group
thereof. For example, if a government restricts access to a product such as
natural gas and offers it for consumption at prices below free market ratcs,
an artificial competitive advantage is provided to the consuming industries
and such practice could be countervailable. On the other hand, if the re-
source is freely available on a nondiscriminatory basis to all purchasers
within a country without government restriction, such as Venezuelan nat-
ural gas, then a countervailable subsidy is not likely to exist.
Id. at 124 (1987).
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adding a "special rule" to the existing definition of subsidy. The provi-
sion required Commerce to determine the actual use of benefits under
partictilar programs by a specific enterprise or industry.88 The Senate
report accompanying the bill makes clear the intent to codify the "use"
test of Cabot I: "The Committee intends that this provision codify the
holding by the United States Court of International Trade in [Cabot I]
that, in order to determine whether a domestic subsidy is countervail-
able, the Commerce Department must examine on a case-by-case basis
whether the benefits provided by a program are bestowed upon a spe-
cific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries."8 9
The more carefully restricted Senate bill, rather than the House bill,
was adopted in the 1988 Trade Act.9" Several Senators made state-
ments attempting to influence interpretation of the amendment during
the floor debate. 9' Congress' adoption of the Senate bill, as explained in
88 See S. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 333, 133 CONG. REC. 1851 (1987), which
proposed to add the following language to the Tariff Act of 1930 § 771(5), 19 U.S.C. §
1677(5) (1982):
(B) SPECIAL RULE - In applying subparagraph (A), the administer-
ing authority, in each investigation, shall determine whether the bounty,
grant, or subsidy in law or in fact is provided to a specific enterprise or
industry, or group of enterprises or industries. Nominal general availabil-
ity, under the terms of the law, regulations, program, or rule establishing
a bounty, grant, or subsidy, of the benefits thereunder is not a basis for
determining that the bounty, grant, or subsidy is not, or has not been, in
fact provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group thereof.
S9 S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1987).
90 See 1988 Trade Act § 1312; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
587, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1547, 1620.
91 For example, Senator Bentsen, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee,
stated, "Because of the importance of this issue in the administration of the counter-
vailing duty law, I want to clarify that the conference agreed to the Senate provision."
134 CONG. REC. S4903 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1988). Similarly, Senator Packwood stated,
"The Finance Committee report rejected the notion that the Commerce Department
must determine the individual competitive benefit of a governmental program that is
generally available both in law and in fact." 134 CONG. REC. S4912 (daily ed. Apr. 27,
1988).
Congressman Gibbons offered a contrasting interpretation:
[T]he Ways and Means Committee report . . . clearly states the commit-
tee's intent to codify the Cabot rule requiring the examination of whether
competitive benefits are conferred by a government program on identifi-
able recipients-as opposed to society at large. In my judgment, the Senate
report . . . also clearly embraced the Cabot rule.
134 CONG. REC. H5522 (daily ed. July 13, 1988) (citations omitted). While no one
would quarrel with Congressman Gibbons' statement that the Senate bill and report
"embraced the [Cabot I] rule," the complete legislative history indicates that it was the
"use" rule which the Senate embraced and incorporated in the bill ultimately enacted
into law.
Congressman Gibbons has introduced a bill dealing with "resource input subsi-
dies" in each of the last several years, e.g., H.R. 2451, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985),
that would have radically changed the definition of a subsidy and have specifically
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the Senate report, however, establishes that the amendment is limited to
codifying the "use" test of Cabot I.
Just as it would be illogical to interpret Cabot I in a self-contra-
dictory manner, it would be unsound to interpret Congress' refinement
of the specificity test to render refinement irrelevant in an entire class
of cases. Congress' refinement of the specificity test (by directing Com-
merce to look at the actual use of foreign government programs) con-
firms that Congress intends Commerce to examine the distribution, or
specificity, of such programs. It would be unreasonable to draw a con-
trary conclusion from an isolated phrase or two in a legislative history
which, taken as a whole, strongly emphasizes the importance of the
''use" test.
3.2.1.4. Commerce's Practice
The 1988 amendment to the specificity test applies to all Com-
merce proceedings initiated after the date the 1988 Trade Act was en-
acted.92 Should the Federal Circuit in PPG overturn the specificity test
in favor of some broader analysis, the expanded test will apply only to
countervailing duty investigations and reviews initiated before August
23, 1988. For new investigations and reviews, the specificity test will
continue to be the de facto "use" test endorsed by the CIT in Cabot I
and Congress in the 1988 Trade Act.
Commerce will almost certainly continue to employ the current
''use" test for specificity in new investigations in accordance with the
1988 Trade Act, regardless of the outcome of the PPG appeal. Poten-
tial petitioners in energy import countervailing duty cases should there-
fore take a close look at the actual benefits of government programs
involving production of energy or derivative products. There would
seem to be little doubt under the present test, for example, that oil from
overturned Commerce's treatment of Mexican natural gas in PPG. His proposal would
have made the government provision of natural resources such as crude oil or natural
gas countervailable if the government price was lower than the "fair market value,"
unless the resource was made available to U.S. producers at the low price. The "fair
market value" of the resource input would have been measured against the export
price, world price, or other arm's-length commercial measure. The proposal contained
no specificity requirement and thus would have applied even if every domestic industry
received the lower price. The Gibbons bill did not become part of the final House trade
bill. See H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988). For a general analysis of the Gibbons
bill, see Bello & Holmer, Subsidies and Natural Resources: Congress Rejects a Lat-
eral Attack on the Specificity Test, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 297 (1984).
See also 134 CONG. REC. S10,576 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1988) (statement of Senator
Baucus, incorporating a statement by Congressman Gibbons).
92 Section 1337(b) of the 1988 Trade Act, 102 Stat. 1211, provides that § 1312
(the recodified specificity test) "shall only apply with respect to investigations and re-
views initiated after the date of enactment of this Act [Aug. 23, 1988]".
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major producing countries is generally sold to all domestic industries at
below-world-market prices and, accordingly, is not a countervailable
subsidy to domestic producers of downstream products.
Commerce's adoption and application of the "use" test of Cabot I
is best illustrated by two Canadian lumber cases. In the first case,
Commerce considered the prices charged for the right to harvest timber
in the "stumpage" programs of the Canadian federal and provincial
governments and determined the programs were not specifically pro-
vided to the softwood products industry because they were generally
available.93 In the second case, Commerce reversed its determination
regarding the benefits' specificity, based partly on application of the
Cabot I "use" test.94 In addition to the "use" test, Commerce consid-
ered the extent to which the Canadian government affirmatively
targeted benefits to the particular industry. 5 Accordingly, while Com-
" See Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,395,
10,403 (1983) (preliminary negative determination):
[W]e preliminarily determine that stumpage programs are not provided
only to a "specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or indus-
tries." Rather, they are available within Canada on similar terms regard-
less of the industry or enterprise of the recipient. The only limitations as
to the types of industries that use stumpage reflect the inherent character-
istics of this natural resource and the current level of technology. As tech-
nological advances have increased the potential users of standing timber,
stumpage has been made available to the new users. Any current limita-
tions on use are not due to the activities of the Canadian governments;
there is no evidence of governmental targeting regarding stumpage.
9 Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 57,453,
38,455-56 (1986) (preliminary affirmative determination).
We also note that the specificity test has been closely examined and ques-
tioned by the Court of International Trade. [In Cabot I], the court rejected
the Department's specificity test . . . . That decision has prompted a re-
evaluation of the specificity test within the Department. . . . Thus, con-
trary to our determination in Softwood Products, the industries actually
using provincial stumpage do not include the furniture manufacturing
industries.
Id. at 37,455-56.
95
Based on our six years of experience in administering the law, we have
found thus far that the specificity test cannot be reduced to a precise math-
ematical formula. Instead, we must exercise judgment and balance various
factors in analyzing the facts of a particular case in order to determine
whether an "unfair" practice is taking place.
Among the factors we consider are: (1) The extent to which a foreign
government acts to limit the availability of a program; (2) the number of
enterprises, industries, or groups thereof which actually use a program,
which may include the examination of disproportionate or dominant users;
and (3) the extent to which the government exercises discretion in making
the program available.
Id. at 37,456.
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merce examines the actual use of programs it investigates, the specific-
ity test has not been reduced to a mere analysis of use. 6
3.2.1.5. Summary of Specificity
Foreign government programs are not countervailable unless they
benefit a specific enterprise or industry. Programs used by a particular
industry, such as electricity generation, would appear to satisfy the
specificity test. Programs providing energy at below-world-market rates
to a broad class of users within an economy would not satisfy the speci-
ficity test. The outcome of the PPG appeal may affect the specificity
test for investigations and reviews initiated before August 23, 1988. In-
vestigations and reviews initiated after that date, however, will be gov-
erned by the specificity test as amended by the 1988 Trade Act, codify-
ing the "use" test of Cabot L
3.2.2. Preferentiality
The second test Commerce applies to foreign government pro-
grams to determine countervailability is the preferentiality test. The
preferentiality test attempts to determine the value of subsidies granted
to specific enterprises or industries. Preferentiality is measured by com-
paring the value of the benefit bestowed with a "benchmark" value for
that benefit.97 The benchmark will be the price of comparable goods or
96 Cases involving government provision of infrastructure to domestic producers
present issues similar to those which would be presented in an energy imports case. A
leading determination on infrastructure is Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia,
50 Fed. Reg. 47,788 (1985) (preliminary affirmative determination), where Commerce
found that roads, ports, utilities, and training centers in two Saudi industrial estates
were not sector-specific, because the industrial estates were available to, and used by, a
broad range of Saudi industry.
On the other hand, in a recent investigation of industrial phosphoric acid from
Israel, Commerce found the provision of a railway line to a particular industry to con-
fer a specific benefit. Commerce based its decision on the fact that the railway line had
been built especially for, and was used almost exclusively by, a few chemical companies
located in the desert region of Israel. Industrial Phosphoric Acid from Israel, 52 Fed.
Reg. 25,447 (1987) (final affirmative determination) [hereinafter Industrial
Phosphoric Acid].
Close questions would be presented by regional energy projects used primarily by
local industry. See, e.g., Industrial Nitrocellulose from France, 53 Fed. Reg. 7,776
(1988) (preliminary determination), in which Commerce found a regional grant for
infrastructure to be countervailable. In cases where the energy produced by the project
is used by all local industry, Commerce would most likely find that the benefit was not
specific. Where the project was built for a particular industry (for example, an electric-
ity-generation facility built specifically to power a large aluminum plant), the facility
would most likely be treated as a specific benefit to that plant.
97 The statutory basis for the preferentiality test is the definition of "subsidy" in
Section 771(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982). Once the cash
equivalent of the subsidy has been determined, it is allocated over an appropriate pe-
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services in the same country where the government has supplied goods
or services.98 The benchmark will be a relevant commercial standard
where the government has provided capital, loans, or loan guarantees.9
Preferentiality may be easy to determine if an objective benchmark,
such as prices of comparable products or the prevailing commercial in-
terest rate, is available. Conversely, if no such standard is at hand (e.g.,
for valuing shares which are not publicly traded), then preferentiality
may be difficult to determine.
Commerce was required to determine the degree of preferentiality
of the feedstock supplied to carbon black producers in the first adminis-
trative review of carbon black from Mexico.'0 0 Because two companies
exclusively purchased all of the carbon black feedstock in Mexico, there
were no other sales against which to compare the price charged to the
two producers. In order to establish a method for choosing an alterna-
tive standard, Commerce promulgated a draft "preferentiality appen-
dix." The appendix sets out a hierarchy of benchmarks for govern-
ment-supplied goods and services prices where identical product sales
by the same seller are unavailable.' ' The alternatives are, in order of
preference: (1) prices charged by the same seller for a similar or related
good; (2) prices charged within the jurisdiction by other sellers for an
identical good or service; (3) the same seller's cost of producing the
good or service; (4) external prices. 10 2 The preferentiality appendix re-
riod of time. See Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Argentina, 49
Fed. Reg. 18,006, 18,016 (1984) (final determination).
98 In Softwood Products, 48 Fed. Reg. at 24,167, Commerce stated:
[SItumpage programs clearly involve the prosision [sic] of a good (raw tim-
ber), and thus clearly fall within sucsection [sic] (ii) . . . . The standard
contained in subsection (ii) is "preferential," which normally means only
more favorable to some within the relevant jurisdiction than to others
within that jurisdiction. Id. (footnote omitted). In this context, it does not
mean "inconsistent with commercial considerations," a distinct term used
in subsection 771(5)(B)(i).
99 Id. Commerce stated, "In our opinion, subsections 771(5)(B)(i)-(iv) are mutu-
ally exclusive. We recognize that subsections (i)-(iv) are not an all-inclusive list of do-
mestic subsidies. However, we maintain that where a particular subsection clearly cov-
ers a given program, the determination whether that program is a subsidy must be
based upon the standard provided in the relevant subsection." Id.
100 Carbon Black from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269 (1986).
101 Id. at 13,272.
102 Id. at 13,272-73. The preferentiality appendix was not designed as a major
departure from Commerce's traditional application of the preferentiality rule. For ex-
ample, Commerce continues to define subsidies in relation to standards within the
country operating the program under investigation. Comparisons to external standards
are permitted only as a last resort. Id.
Applying the appendix to the carbon black review, Commerce used the price
charged by the same seller (PEMEX) for a similar or related good (heavy fuel oil)
which it determined to be a reasonable substitute for to the feedstock (with certain
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mains the best indicator of Commerce's approach to determining the
degree of preferentiality of government-provided goods and services.
However, it is not a formal regulation and is therefore subject to
change.
The potential benefits to production of energy or its derivative
products are varied, and the range of potential benchmarks is so great,
that no comprehensive survey of preferentiality will be attempted in
this article. Where the program provides goods and services, Commerce
will look to sales of the same good by the same producer, then to simi-
lar transactions according to the hierarchy set forth in the preferential-
ity appendix. Where the program provides funds or their equivalent,10
Commerce will look for a reasonable commercial benchmark.
It may be safe to assume that no major legislative changes in the
preferentiality test are forthcoming, because the 1988 Trade Act did not
contain any provisions which would affect the test.04 The major obsta-
cle to obtaining a countervailing duty order on energy products would
be showing that the benefits were granted to a specific enterprise or
industry, rather than measuring the benefits concerned.
4. THE STATUS OF CANADIAN ELECTRICITY UNDER THE FAIR
TRADE LAWS
Canada has vast untapped hydroelectric potential. Hydroelectric
generation of electricity is significantly cheaper than coal generation,
which is the least expensive alternative available in the United States.
Given hydroelectric power's substantial comparative price advantage
adjustments). The subsidy amount would have been the amount by which the price of
the feedstock undercut the price of heavy fuel oil. In fact, Commerce found that the
price of carbon black feedstock was not preferential in comparison with the price of
heavy fuel oil and, therefore, did not confer a countervailing subsidy. Id. at 13,271.
'03 Cases involving government infrastructure provision may again be useful in
analyzing the provision of energy at below-world-market rates. In Industrial
Phosphoric Acid, for example, involving a railway line built specifically for the pro-
ducer being investigated, Commerce compared the rates charged by the Israeli govern-
ment for use of the line to the rail rates prevailing in other areas of Israel. Commerce
found that the rates on the special lines were actually higher than average, and there-
fore did not provide a preferential benefit. 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,447. It may be argued,
however, that Commerce should have compared the rate of cost recovery on the two
lines. The desert line may have been far more expensive to build, and a cost-recovery
test might have uncovered a subsidy to the plant.
104 The House bill preceding the 1988 Trade Act contained a provision that
would have incorporated a hierarchy of benchmarks for measuring preferentiality into
the countervailing duty law. See OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF
1988, CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3, H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 587 (1988) [hereinafter TRADE AT CONFERENCE REPORT]. The Sen-
ate bill did not contain a preferentiality hierarchy, however, and the House proposal
was ultimately dropped. Id.
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over electricity generated from fossil or atomic fuels, it is not surprising
that U.S. imports of Canadian electricity have grown steadily in recent
years. This is particularly true in New England, distant from the major
U.S. coal fields, yet relatively close to the enormous hydroelectric re-
sources of Quebec. The coal producing states, the U.S. coal industry,
and certain utilities do not share New England's enthusiasm for Cana-
dian hydroelectric power and have formulated a number of charges
against Canada. The allegations include the charge that Canadian elec-
tricity is priced on a two-tiered system." 5
The status of electricity under the antidumping and countervailing
duty laws has become a significant issue due to imported Canadian
electricity.'0 6 The laws apply to imported "merchandise,"'0 7 and their
legislative histories indicate that the term "merchandise" refers to arti-
cles, goods, and products.' 08 The customs laws similarly define mer-
chandise as "goods, wares, and chattels."' 0 9 Although customs classifi-
cations are not automatically dispositive of scope questions under the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws, Congress has indicated that
they are an important guide." 0 The antidumping and countervailing
duty laws have commonly been thought to extend to fuels consumed to
manufacture electricity (such as petroleum, natural gas, coal, and ura-
nium) but not to electricity itself."'
Article 901(2) of the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agree-
ment treats electricity as an "energy good.""' 2 Under Article 902, the
parties affirm their "respective rights and obligations under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT].""' 3 Taken together, the
10I See generally AD Hoc COALITION ON INTERNATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER
TRADE, IMPORTS OF CANADIAN POWER A GROWING CONCERN (1987).
106 The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Robert E. Nielsen,
Esq., on this issue.
107 Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 701, 731, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (1982).
108 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-45, reprinted in 1979 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 381, 429-31.
... Tariff Act of 1930 § 401, 19 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
1.0 For example, when Congress wished to render certain monetary instruments,
listed as intangibles under the tariff schedules, subject to the provisions of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986), it specifically reclassified
them in the tariff schedules.
... Of course, the term "good" does not necessarily refer to a physical object
which can be put into a box. The term can best be understood in contradistinction to
services.
112 Free-Trade Agreement art. 901(2), 27 I.L.M. at 343. Article 901(2) defines
"energy goods" as those goods classified in the Harmonized System under Chapter 27.
U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED
STATES, USITC PUB. No. 2030, ch. 27 (1st ed. 1988) [hereinafter HTS]. This in-
cludes electricity, which is classified under heading 2716. HTS at 27-7.
.11 Free-Trade Agreement art. 902, 27 I.L.M. at 343.
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two provisions indicate that the rights of each party under GATT (in-
cluding antidumping and countervailing duty remedies) apply to im-
ports of electricity from the other party.
11 4
The enactment of the new harmonized tariff schedules has clouded
the picture. The harmonized schedules115 specifically list electricity as a
good." 6 However, a disclaimer in the legislative history of the 1988
Trade Act suggests an intent to block the interpretation that this classi-
fication subjects electricity to the antidumping and countervailing duty
laws. 1  Due to the conflicting implications of the harmonized tariff
schedules, it is uncertain whether electricity is subject to the counter-
vailing duty law. Commerce has not considered the issue, the Customs
precedents are not dispositive, and the legislative history of the 1988
Trade Act is not clear enough to settle the issue. Defining electricity as
a good in the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement is a clear
statement that U.S. negotiators intended to apply the countervailing
duty law to imports of Canadian electricity.
If electricity is treated as a good subject to the countervailing duty
laws, imports of electricity from Canada constitute a potentially signifi-
cant issue. Because any countervailing duties imposed on electricity
from Canada would offset only the amount of any net subsidy, how-
14 This conclusion is reinforced by a comment from the U.S. Negotiating Team:
Certainly, it was the intention of the U.S. negotiators that all disciplines of
the GATT regarding trade in goods should apply to all energy commodi-
ties covered by Chapter Nine of the FTA [Federal Trade Administration],
including electricity. U.S. spokesmen so stated during the negotiations, as
well as publicly subsequently to the FTA's signing; Canada has at no time
disputed this view.
United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Energy Provisions: Negotiating History
and Interpretive Notes (Negotiating Team July 28, 1988).
115 See 1988 Trade Act § 1204, 102 Stat. 1148-50.
116 HTS at 27-7, heading 2716.00.
117 See TRADE AcT CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 104, at 550:
Electricity and Electrical Energy
Electricity and electrical energy were considered to be "intangibles" under
the existing TSUS [Tariff Schedules of the United States] and therefore
not subject to the entry requirements applicable to imported articles. Al-
though the HTS [Harmonized Tariff Schedule] has a specific heading for
"electrical energy," additional U.S. legal note 8(b) in chapter 27 of the
HTS provides that electrical energy shall continue to be exempt from stat-
utory entry requirements, but instead "shall be entered on a periodic basis
in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury." This provision will facilitate the collection of import statistics
on electrical energy without otherwise affecting its legal status under U.S.
trade laws.
While the body of this statement is concerned with ensuring that entry papers do
not have to be presented every time a kilowatt of electricity crosses the border, the last
sentence implies that enactment of the harmonized tariff system should not change the
status of electricity under the countervailing duty law.
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ever, the presumed comparative advantage enjoyed by Canadian hydro-
electric power would remain unaffected.
5. THE CANADIAN CONNECTION: UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE-
TRADE AGREEMENT
The United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement (Agreement)
signed January 2, 1988,118 is expected to have a significant positive
effect on energy trade in the new free trade area. 9 By prohibiting
volume and price controls and price discrimination, the Agreement
should bolster energy exports from Canada, particularly of natural gas
and electricity, both currently important to U.S. consumption. 20 Indus-
tries on both sides of the border will experience fluctuations in their
operating profits as a result of the changing import situation and will
be likely to consider seeking relief under the trade laws.
Canada placed a high priority on exemption or favorable treat-
ment under U.S. "contingency protection" 2' laws throughout the nego-
tiations. The countervailing duty law presented a particular concern to
the Canadians. As one Canadian official stated:
Given the dominance of the United States in the practice of
countervail, the United States has had a virtual monopoly in
defining what are and what are not countervailable subsi-
dies. (The GATT code does not define what is a subsidy.)
Through its preferentiality and specificity tests . . ., the US
[sic] unilaterally determines what foreign practices it will
and will not tolerate. As Canadian exporters have learned
11 The agreement was approved in the United States on September 28, 1988, and
implemented by the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 [hereinafter FTA Implementation Act]
and in Canada on December 30, 1988, by the Canada-United States Free-Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Bill C-2.
9 Crowe, Energy, in ABA NAT'L INST. ON UNITED STATES/CANADA FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT 215,229 (1988); M. Rothman, supra note 7.
120 Crowe, supra note 119, at 217-22. Crowe reports that electricity exports from
Canada have increased sevenfold since 1970 and that for three decades Canada has
been an important supplier of natural gas to the United States. Id. at 222.
121 The phrase "contingency protection" is attributed to Canada's trade negotiator
during the GATT Tokyo Round, Rodney Grey. The term refers to the antidumping,
countervailing duty, and safeguard (escape clause) laws whose relief is "contingent" on
proof of relevant situations, such as dumping, subsidies, and injury from global imports.
These laws are looked upon by those enamored of the term as the new protectionist
weapons, and are in this view to be contrasted with tariffs, which are not subject to
such eventualities and are much less capable of being used as administered protection
laws. See Hart, Trade Remedy Law and the Canada-United States Trade Negotia-
tions in ABA NAT'L INST. ON UNITED STATES/CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
273, 283 (1988).
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over the years, these tests have proven increasingly flexible of
application and the ambit of the countervailing duty statute
has expanded every year.
122
Canada's perception that U.S. countervailing duty law is unpre-
dictable and represents "administered protection" arises in large part
from Canada's experience with a single import: lumber. In 1983, the
Department of Commerce found that the prices charged by the Cana-
dian federal and provincial governments for stumpage rights were not
countervailable subsidies.123 Three years later, the Department deter-
mined preliminarily that stumpage rights conferred a fifteen percent
subsidy.1 24 The issues of specificity and preferentiality are complex,
and simplistic comparisons of the two lumber cases lead quickly to in-
accurate conclusions. Nevertheless, from a perception standpoint, the
difference in outcomes suggest to some Canadian observers substantial
discretion in administration of the countervailing duty law in the
United States.
The perception that U.S. administrators wielded great discretion
led Canadian negotiators to demand that Canadian goods be treated
differently under a free-trade agreement than imports from other coun-
tries are treated under U.S. law. With this thought in mind, the two
sides negotiated the substance of unfair pricing and subsidies, with no
intention of resolving disputes other than by national court review.
Some progress was made in the negotiations, particularly promising ap-
proaches for dealing with dumping, as tariffs and other barriers come
down between Canada and the United States.
Subsidies presented the greater challenge, and it proved impossible
to resolve on the negotiation timetable for the Free-Trade Agreement.
This is not at all surprising. The key to a bilateral agreement on subsi-
dies is an agreement on what constitutes a subsidy, or at least on what
122 Id.
123 Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,395 (1983).
124 Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (1986).
Before the Department of Commerce issued a final determination, the petitioners with-
drew their petition on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding reached Decem-
ber 30, 1986, between the governments of Canada and the United States, by which
Canada agreed to impose a 15% export tax on lumber shipped to the United States
until the provinces increased their stumpage charges sufficiently to overcome the alleged
subsidization. 52 Fed. Reg. 315 (1987); Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
Trade in Certain Softwood Lumber Products, United States-Canada, 52 Fed. Reg. 233
(1987). British Columbia and Quebec have since increased the prices charged to their
lumber industry for stumpage rights to offset the export tax either fully or in part.
Amendments to Memorandum of Understanding concerning trade in certain softwood
lumber products, United States-Canada (Dec. 16, 1987 & Apr. 7, 1988)(amending
Memorandum of Understanding, Dec. 30, 1986, United States-Canada)(texts available
through Office of the United States Trade Representative).
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constitutes a prohibited or actionable subsidy. In forty years, the signa-
tories to the GATT have been unable to agree on that point, so it did
not come as a surprise that U.S. and Canadian negotiators could not
find a solution in a few short months.
In addition, the United States was interested in negotiating real
and enforceable discipline over Canadian subsidies. That raised ques-
tions of national sovereignty for Canada. In general, negotiating a free-
trade agreement with the United States raised highly emotional and
political concerns over national sovereignty in some quarters in Ca-
nada,125 and the subsidies issue in particular attracted highly volatile
sentiment.
Canada believed that, despite the controversy, a new way to deal
with unfair trade cases was critical to bilateral relations and to bilateral
commitment to the Agreement. Ultimately, the two governments agreed
to allow independent review of antidumping and countervailing duty
decisions in a forum created by the Free-Trade Agreement.
5.1. Provisions of the Free-Trade Agreement
The Agreement does not call for substantive modification of the
antidumping or countervailing duty laws in either country.126 Each
government reserved the right to continue applying its antidumping and
countervailing duty laws to imports from the other country. The gov-
ernments also agreed that these laws could be modified even after the
Agreement enters into force, on the condition that any such change ex-
pressly state its application to imports from the other country and be
subject to a nonbinding dispute settlement process127 The centerpiece
of the Agreement is the provision that review of final determinations
made under the antidumping and countervailing duty laws of the two
countries will be subject to binding dispute settlement by independent
binational panels, rather than by national courts.'
2
1
Thus, under the Agreement, the Department of Commerce and
the International Trade Commission investigate allegations of dumping
125 A telling illustration is that the Progressive Conservative Party of Prime Min-
ister Brian Mulroney was forced by the raging debate on the free-trade agreement to
call national elections to gain public sanction for bringing the agreement into force in
Canada.
126 Free-Trade Agreement, 27 I.L.M. at 386-87.
12 7 Id. arts. 1902(2), 1903, 27 I.L.M. at 386. If the dispute settlement panel finds
that the statutory amendment is inconsistent with GATT or with the purposes of the
Free-Trade Agreement, the panel may recommend modifications to bring the amended
statute into conformity. If consultations to reach a mutually satisfactory solution are
unsuccessful, the government that requested the panel may either enact mirror legisla-
tion or terminate the Agreement.
128 Id. art. 1904, 27 I.L.M. at 387.
[Vol. 11:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol11/iss2/4
INT'L ENERGY TRADE & UNFAIR TRADE LAWS
and government subsidization and injury to domestic industry, in accor-
dance with current U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws (in-
cluding relevant court decisions, legislative history, regulations, and ad-
ministrative precedent). The Agreement's terms are triggered only if a
party seeks review of a final determination of Commerce or the Com-
mission. In that event, a party otherwise entitled to bring an appeal to
the United States Court of International Trade, as provided by current
law,129 may seek review before a panel composed of five U.S. and Ca-
nadian citizens chosen for their "good character, high standing and re-
pute, . . . objectivity, reliability, sound judgment, and general familiar-
ity with international trade law."' 30 The majority of a panel, including
the chair, must also be lawyers.'
The requirements that most of a panel be lawyers and that even
the nonlawyers have a general familiarity with international trade law
follow naturally from the standards to be applied by a panel in its re-
view. The panel's function is to determine whether the investigating
authority has properly applied domestic antidumping or countervailing
duty law in reaching the challenged determination, based solely on the
administrative record that was before the agency and on the standard of
review and general legal principles that would apply in the courts of
the importing country."3 2 If the panel decides that the investigating au-
thority incorrectly applied that country's antidumping or countervailing
duty law, the panel will remand the determination for action not incon-
sistent with the panel's decision within a specified time limit.1 3
As a safety valve, the Agreement gives the governments access to
an "extraordinary challenge" before a committee of judges or former
judges if unusual circumstances jeopardize the integrity of the bina-
tional panel review process. An extraordinary challenge may be sought
if: a panelist has a serious conflict of interest; if the panel has deviated
seriously from a fundamental rule of procedure; or if the panel has
manifestly exceeded its authority (for instance, by basing its decision on
129 Tariff Act of 1930 § 516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982). The party must meet
the statutory definition of an "interested party," Tariff Act of 1930 § 771(9), 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(9) (1982), and have participated in the administrative proceeding below. Tariff
Act of 1930 § 516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1982).
..0 Free-Trade Agreement Annex 1901.2(1), (2), (4), 27 I.L.M. at 393. Each gov-
ernment chooses two panelists. If the governments cannot agree on the fifth panelist,
the four appointed panelists will attempt to reach agreement and, if they do not, the
fifth panelist is chosen by lot from the roster of panelists previously developed by the
two governments. Id. Annex 1901.2(3), 27 I.L.M. at 393.
131 Id.
132 Free-Trade Agreement art. 1904(2)-(3), 27 I.L.M. at 387. Article 1911 of the
Agreement defines "standard of review," "general legal principles," and "administra-
tive record." Id., 27 I.L.M. at 391-93.
133 Id. art. 1904(8), 27 I.L.M. at 388.
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matters outside the administrative record).134 Because these actions are
extraordinary measures to ensure the continued viability of the process,
only governments have authority to establish an extraordinary chal-
lenge committee.1 35
Despite the legalistic and detailed nature of these procedures, they
are not to be permanent appendages of the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws. The governments have seven years to develop a sub-
stitute system of rules governing unfair pricing and government subsi-
dization in their bilateral trade.'36 This essentially means vigorous
continuation of the discussions already begun during the free-trade area
negotiations, and anticipates substantially greater discipline over Cana-
dian subsidy practices. The Agreement does not contemplate failure in
this effort. If the governments are unable to agree, the only remedy is
the option to terminate the Agreement. 3
5.2. Implications for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Litigants
Practitioners must consider a variety of factors when weighing the
potential impact of this new, albeit temporary, review mechanism for
the antidumping and countervailing duty decisions, regardless of the
product involved. The most obvious area for concern is panel selection.
The method by which Canada and the United States place candidates
on a selection roster when a panel is requested, as well as the selection
process for a particular review, will indicate whether panels can be
expected to reach "judicious" decisions. Panelists will not be subject to
the usual presidential appointment and Senate confirmation process
under the procedure agreed upon in the United States. After extensive
consultation with the Administration under the fast-track procedure of
the Trade Act of 1974,138 the United States agreed that the panelists
will be appointed from a roster recommended to the United States
Trade Representative. Nominations will be made by an interagency
committee without regard to political affiliation. Prospective panelists
will provide financial and other disclosures to the interagency commit-
tee in order to ensure qualification for service and no conflict of interest
134 Id. art. 1904(13), 27 I.L.M. at 388-89.
135 Id.
... Id. arts. 1906, 1907, 27 I.L.M. at 390.
17 Id. art. 1906, 27 I.L.M. at 390. Under the Agreement, the binational panel
review system would not end unless the agreement was amended or terminated. The
implementing legislation in the United States shows the strong interest of the U.S.
Congress in early and successful conclusion of the negotiations and sets very specific
negotiating objectives. See FTA Implementation Act § 409, 102 Stat. 1851, 1894-97.
13' Trade Act of 1974 § 151, 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1982).
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due to financial holdings and employment affiliations."3 9 The Trade
Representative then will present a preliminary roster to Congressional
committees and develop a final roster of individuals eligible to be se-
lected should a binational panel or committee be requested. This pro-
cess would be repeated each year." "
The complicated procedure of panel appointment is obviously the
product of compromise. We believe the practitioner can expect that
U.S. panelist appointees will be chosen on the basis of their under-
standing of the legal principles involved in an antidumping or counter-
vailing duty determination review. Considerations such as whether the
determination was reached by the U.S. or Canadian authorities, or
whether the panelist will "vote the flag" are unlikely to affect appoint-
ment. The specific method of selection in Canada remains unclear, but
the objective prerequisites are set out in the Agreement. " The tenor of
Chapter 19 as a rule-driven, not a political, process creates optimism
that political considerations in both countries will be subordinated to
the common interest in carefully analytical, legally sound, credible
panel decisions. Only an objective method of panel selection justifies the
high confidence governments have placed in these binational arbitral
bodies.
Practitioners can take comfort in the requirement that panels must
base their consideration of a determination on the same standard of
review used in judicial review. In the United States, this means the
determination would be upheld unless it is unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 2
Again, this is a rule-driven process, and panelists may not consider
nongermane factors such as foreign affairs considerations, the national
economic interest, or similar factors.
Another practical incident of panel review is that a panel be re-
quested by one of the parties to the administrative proceeding below."'
The provision recognizes that disputes arise in the context of private
concerns over unfair pricing and government subsidization, despite the
fact that the binational panel system was crafted to resolve trade dis-
putes between two nations. The implementing legislation in the United
States goes beyond the Agreement in prohibiting the United States from
'39 FTA Implementation Act § 405(a), 102 Stat. 1851, 1888 (1988).
140 Id.
141 See Free-Trade Agreement ch. 19, 27 I.L.M. at 386-94.
142 Free-Trade Agreement arts. 1904(3), 1911, 27 I.L.M. at 387-91. If the review
concerns a Commission determination not to initiate a changed circumstances review,
the standard is whether the determination is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
143 Free-Trade Agreement art. 1904(5), 27 I.L.M. at 387.
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requesting panel review unless an interested party wants a panel. 1"
This has two effects, neither of which amounts to a significant problem.
First, the United States cannot "sue" itself, and the Administration
cannot seek to have a Commission determination overturned by a panel.
Second, the United States cannot opt for panel review over court review
if no other party (and the Government of Canada) objects to court re-
view. This latter possibility otherwise exists because the Agreement
permits review of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations
in the Court of International Trade if no panel request is made within
the thirty-day period following publication of a determination. 5 Pri-
vate parties are entitled to appear before panels and be represented by
their own counsel, another important aspect of current judicial review
that is carried over to the binational panel system.
146
Another notable aspect of the binational panel process is that the
courts will continue to hear constitutional claims.14 7 The constitutional-
ity of the Agreement's implementing legislation and the substitution of
binational panel review for court review should be subject to challenge
in the courts. The courts will also review any constitutional claims aris-
ing out of the determination itself after a particular binational panel's
consideration of the other alleged defects in the determination has been
completed. " 8 Consistent with current judicial practice, courts will not
reach the constitutional claims unless the matter cannot be resolved on
other grounds.
The binational panel process resolves issues considerably faster
than the courts. The panel's final decision must be issued within 315
days after the request for convening a panel is made.4 9 The require-
144 FTA Implementation Act § 401(c), 102 Stat. 1878 (1988).
" Free-Trade Agreement art. 1904(12)(a), 27 I.L.M. at 388. Because this thirty-
day time period coincides with the current period provided by Tariff Act of 1930 §
516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1982), for commencement of review in the Court of Inter-
national Trade, the period for court review has been amended for determinations in-
volving Canadian goods to begin on the thirty-first day after publication of the determi-
nation at issue. FTA Implementation Act § 401(a), 102 Stat. 1878 (1988).
148 Free-Trade Agreement art. 1904(7), 27 I.L.M. at 388.
147 FTA Implementation Act § 401(c), 102 Stat. 1878-83 (1988).
148 Id. Dozens of legal opinions have been written addressing constitutional issues
raised by the Agreement. We will mention two: Statement of Joseph P. Griffin, Chair-
man, Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar Association, before the
Subcommittee of Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Committee on the Judiciary 2 (Apr. 28, 1988); Letter from Professor David L. Sha-
piro, Harvard Law School, to Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcom-
mittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 12-13 (Feb. 22, 1988). See H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. pt. 4, at 12 (1988).
149 Free-Trade Agreement art. 1904(14). As is the case for judicial review, the
agencies would be given time to complete a remand determination if the determination
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ment should lead to business certainty much earlier than is possible
under judicial review procedures.
Potential litigants before binational panels should be aware that
final decisions of binational panels will not bind other panels, and a
fortiori they will not bind courts.'5 ° Panel decisions could be considered
by a court, to the extent that the decisions are well-reasoned and per-
suasive. The implementing legislation makes this clear. 151 Conversely,
in deciding whether the determination at issue was made in accordance
with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing
country, panels are explictly bound by judicial precedent.' 52
U.S. exporters finding themselves subject to an antidumping or
countervailing duty proceeding in Canada should take note of another
incident of the binational panel process. United States notions of due
process are incorporated into the Agreement, allowing binational panel
review of Canadian determinations which previously were not review-
able at all.' 53 The investigating authority will be required to file with
the panel the administrative record containing all material before the
decisionmaker at the time of decision. The U.S. producer or exporter
may request a timely redetermination of the duty applicable to a partic-
ular entry without first paying the duty assessed, an additional change
from current Canadian law. 54
The binational panel process created by the Free-Trade Agree-
ment is not a model to be emulated in future negotiations. The negotia-
tors from both countries explicitly recognized the transitory nature in
the five-to-seven-year duration clause of article 1906.'55 Practitioners
should be aware of the advantages as well as the disadvantages of the
panel process for as long as it remains available. On balance, binational
panel review should not result in decisions materially different than
those otherwise reached by the courts.
was found wanting. Id. art. 1904(8), 27 I.L.M. at 388.
151 Id. art. 1904(9), 27 I.L.M. at 388.
FTA Implementation Act § 401(d), 102 Stat. at 1883 (1988).
'5 Free-Trade Agreement art. 1904(2), 27 I.L.M. at 387.
... Id. art. 1911, 27 I.L.M. at 392 (definition of "final determination" in the case
of Canada); id. art. 1904(15)(f, 27 I.L.M. at 390. For example, while injury determi-
nations of the Canadian Import Tribunal are currently reviewable, determinations of
dumping and subsidization by the Deputy Minister for Revenue following the original
investigation are not. Review of the dumping or subsidy margin, or its application to
particular goods, is now subject to review only at the time of entry of particular mer-
chandise, only after the duty determined by the customs appraiser has been paid, and
only at the instigation of the Canadian importer. See Special Import Measures Act, §§
41, 56, 61, R.S.C. ch. 5-15 (1985).
154 Free-Trade Agreement art. 1904(15)(a), 27 I.L.M. at 389. See Special Import
Measures Act §§ 56, 58, 59, R.S.C. ch. 5-15 (1985).
'55 Id. art. 1906, 27 I.L.M. at 390.
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6. SECTION 301
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is potentially the most pow-
erful trade statute. It empowers the President to take "appropriate and
feasible action" to "enforce the rights of the United States under any
trade agreement" or to respond to a foreign government action that is
"unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or restricts
United States commerce." '156 A 1984 amendment broadly defined the
term "unreasonable" to include such actions denying fair and equitable
market access or opportunities to establish an enterprise. 5
Like the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, relief claimed
on Section 301 grounds can be imposed on imports from a single coun-
try and is based on unfair trading practices. 5" Unlike those laws, ac-
tion lies within the discretion of the President. 59 Action usually will
not be taken unless the federal agencies with trade responsibilities
agree.' The injury test of whether the government practice "burdens
or restricts" U.S. commerce may not be as onerous as those under the
other trade laws addressed here, because there is no formalized proce-
dure to determine injury before the International Trade Commission
under Section 301, as exists in the case of the antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws. 6'
Until recently, the potential for using Section 301 as a weapon
against unfair trade practices was limited by the requirement that all
federal agencies with trade responsibilities agree to take action, and by
the great discretion of the President. Also, GATT members who were
targets of retaliatory actions could counter-retaliate against U.S. ex-
ports by seeking the sanction of GATT. As a result, past use of Section
301 was almost exclusively for its original purpose of bringing recalci-
trant trading partners to the bargaining table or as the beginning of a
GATT dispute settlement process.
In 1985 and 1986, however, the Administration took the unusual
action of self-initiating a series of cases, ranging from Brazil informat-
ics policy 6 2 to Korean insurance and intellectual property rights, 6 '
... Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a)(2)(B) (1982).
... Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304(0(2), 98 Stat. 3005
(1984) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
158 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (1988).
"" Id. § 2252(a).
160 Id. § 2252(c).
16 Id. § 2251(b).
162 The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) self-initiated
an investigation into Brazil's informatics policy on September 16, 1985. Brazil's In-
formatics Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,608 (1985). On November 23, 1987, the President
announced his intention to impose retaliatory measures and public comments were re-
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and Japanese tobacco products."" In addition, in 1986 the Administra-
tion entered into important agreements involving Canadian softwood
lumber 65 and Japanese semiconductors. 6 The agreements rely heav-
ily on Section 301 to ensure that their terms are met bringing the full
potential of Section 301 to the forefront.
Dual pricing of natural resources, especially schemes denying low
domestic prices to potential U.S. purchasers, could be actionable under
Section 301. Section 301 may offer the best solution to the dual-pricing
problem in light of the difficulties addressing the dual-pricing problem
through anti-dumping or countervailing duty proceedings.'
67
7. SECTION 337: UNFAIR IMPORT PRACTICES
7.1. Background
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930168 gives the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission authority to investigate whether "unfair
methods of competition and unfair acts" in the importation or sale of
articles in the United States have the "effect or tendency" of substan-
tially injuring a domestic industry or, in the case of statutory intellec-
quested. 52 Fed. Reg. 44,939-40, 47,071 (1987). On June 17, 1988, in light of new
software regulations in Brazil, USTR announced that it would not pursue retaliation,
but would continue to monitor the access to the Brazilian market of U.S. software
products.
16 The USTR self-initiated an investigation of Korean practices that restrict the
ability of U.S. insurers to provide insurance services in Korea on September 16, 1985.
Korea's Restrictions on Insurance Services, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1985). An agreement
settling the action by increasing the access of U.S. firms to the Korean insurance mar-
ket was reached on August 14, 1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,443 (1986). An investigation into
Korea's lack of protection for U.S. intellectual property rights was initiated on Novem-
ber 4, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 45,883 (1985), and settled through an agreement with Korea
improving the protection accorded U.S. intellectual property rights reached on August
14, 1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,445 (1986).
164 USTR initiated an investigation into Japan's import barriers to U.S. tobacco
products on September 16, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1985). The investigation was
suspended on October 6, 1986, after an agreement was reached under which Japan
agreed to reduce its tariff on cigarettes to zero, and to eliminate discriminatory taxation
and distribution practices. Determination under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
51 Fed. Reg. 35,995-96 (1986).
165 Proclamation No. 5595, 52 Fed. Reg. 229 (1986).
166 Determination under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg.
27,811 (1986).
167 Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, Foreign Government Regulation of Natural
Resources: Problems and Remedies Under United States International Trade Laws,
21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 29 (1985); Subcommittee on Proposed Trade Barriers to the
Importation of Products Into the United States, ABA Section on International Law and
Practice, The Natural Resource Subsidy Debate: A Critique of Proposed Legislative
Action, 21 INT'L LAW. 285 (1987).
168 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
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tual property rights, whether methods or acts infringe upon the pro-
tected intellectual property right.'69 The Commission can issue a cease
and desist order to the parties involved in the unfair acts or ban the
articles from import if it finds an unfair trade practice.1 0 The Com-
mission's determination is final unless disapproved by the President
"for policy reasons" within sixty days after its issuance.'
The language of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is patterned
after Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." 2 Section 337 is
regarded as an intellectual property infringement remedy, because the
majority of investigations brought under Section 337 involve patent
(process as well as product), trademark, or copyright infringement. The
broader reach of Section 337 language was evidenced recently, when
the section was used as a weapon against high technology products vio-
lating trade secrets or involving predatory pricing, false labeling, group
169 Id. For statutorily-based intellectual property cases (patent, copyright, regis-
tered trademark, or semiconductor mask work), 1988 Trade Act § 1342, 102 Stat.
1212, eliminated the requirement that complainant show injury to a domestic industry
and, in the case of other unfair methods or acts, that the complainant establish that the
domestic industry is "efficiently and economically operated." These changes were made
despite testimony that "using our trade statutes and border control enforcement in a
situation where the domestic industry is inefficient and will not be economically viable
is a waste of resources [and that it] is not in the public interest that relief be given to an
industry unable to utilize it." Intellectual Property and Trade: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1986) (statement of Paula Stern, Chairwo-
man, International Trade Commission) [hereinafter Intellectual Property and Trade
Hearings]. See H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 633 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1666 [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
Arguably, the injury requirement has not been a significant factor in Section 337
cases. Commissioner Ronald Cass outlines the parameters of the debate in R. Cass,
Changes in Section 337 Under the 1988 Trade Act, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
THE NEW TRADE LAW-THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF
1988 219, 228 (1988).
The requirement to prove that an industry exists or is in the process of being
established (without having to show that it is being injured) would be retained, pre-
sumably because nearly half of modern U.S. patents are held by foreign entities. As Dr.
Stern put it "[Tlhe absence of a domestic industry requirement could leave the Com-
mission arbitrating among importers jockeying for market share in the United States
with no appreciable impact on production capability or workers' jobs in the United
States." Intellectual Property and Trade Hearings, supra, at 22. See CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra, at 633-34.
Notably, however, Section 1342 adds a definition of "industry" to apply to Section
337 investigations involving infringement of a patent, registered trademark, copyright,
or mask work. The new definition presents a very low threshold for example, "signifi-
cant investment in plant and equipment," without stating that the investment must be
in the United States. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra, at 634.
170 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (f) (1982).
171 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(2) (1982).
1.72 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). Paragraph (a)(1) declares unlawful "unfair methods of
competition in . . . commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in . . . com-
merce." Id.
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boycotts, false advertising, and false designation of origin.'73 The statu-
tory language of Section 337 potentially reaches dumping and subsidi-
zation investigations. However, Congress provided that the Commission
shall not investigate complaints based solely on acts which arise under
the antidumping or countervailing duty laws, thus avoiding the creation
of duplicate remedies.
17 4
Section 337 is a powerful trade tool due both to the breadth of
business activity it may reach and to its procedural advantages over
judicial alternatives. Unusually effective remedies await the successful
complainant after relatively short statutory deadlines. Because the
Commission's jurisdiction in a Section 337 investigation is in rem, i.e.,
over the products being imported, meaningful relief does not rely on the
Commission's ability to obtain personal jurisdiction over a party.1 5
The Commission's principal remedy is an exclusion order against the
products found to be involved in the unfair act. An exclusion order may
be entered even while the investigation is underway-prompt relief
indeed!"' 6
Reaching a Commission determination on a Section 337 unfair
trade practice claim generally takes considerably less time than reach-
ing a decision on a claim filed in a federal district court.'7 The Com-
mission must conclude its investigation within one year (eighteen
months if the case is complicated), and the President has sixty days
thereafter to notify the Commission of any disapproval for policy rea-
sons.178 Since Section 337 was substantially strengthened in 1974, more
than half of the 240 investigations initiated have been settled.17 9 This is
173 See Palmeter, The U.S. International Trade Commission at Common Law:
Unfair Competition, Trademark, and Section 337 of the Tariff Act, 18 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 497, 503-04 (1984).
174 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3) (1982). If the complaint is based only in part on such
acts, the Commission need not discontinue its course, although the statute encourages
the Commission in such instances to consider notifying the Department of Commerce
and suspending its investigation until an antidumping or countervailing duty investiga-
tion can be concluded. Avoiding overlap in these instances is in the Commission's inter-
est since, of course, it has a joint role with Commerce in antidumping or countervailing
duty investigations.
171 Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus and Components Thereof, USITC
Pub. 1210, Inv. No. 337-TA-97, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 234 (June 30, 1981). For
this reason, a foreign respondent gains little by ignoring the Commission's orders dur-
ing an investigation, e.g., discovery requests.
17" 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (e) (1982). Temporary exclusion orders under paragraph
(e) in effect during an investigation permit entry under a bond determined by the
Commission.
'77 Note, however, that Commission determinations are subject to judicial chal-
lenge under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1982).
178 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(b)(1), (g)(2) (1982).
171 Intellectual Property and Trade Hearings, supra note 169, at 3.
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a clear sign of the intimidating nature of the remedy and of the low
injury threshold applied to such clearly unfair trade practices as those
addressed by Section 337.
An exclusion order can reach the imports of a company that was
not even shipping to the United States at the time of the order (and is
not from the same country as the company that was), if the company's
goods infringe the U.S. patent, trademark, or copyright at issue. This is
because an exclusion order applies to the articles being imported that
are within its scope, as opposed to particular named respondents. 8s
However, since the President's disapproval of the broad exclusion order
issued by the Commission in a case involving headboxes,' 8 ' the Com-
mission has refused to penalize new exporters with the same sanctions
applied to the respondents involved in the investigation. Unless the evi-
dence shows a pattern of unauthorized use, along with business condi-
tions that would justify the conclusion that other companies will at-
tempt to engage in similar practices, the Commission will narrowly
tailor the scope of its exclusion order to affect only the respondents
investigated." 2
The Commission has authority to order any person found to be
violating Section 337 to cease and desist from the violation,' and to
enforce these orders by civil penalties in the federal courts (normally,
the District Court for the District of Columbia). 84 A cease and desist
order might be more appropriate than an exclusion order for violations
such as false advertising, which generally occurs within the United
States. Both an exclusion order and a cease and desist order could issue
180 At the Commission's discretion, exclusion orders can be limited to articles im-
ported from particular foreign respondents. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1982). See Certain
Headboxes and Papermaking Machine Forming Sections for the Continuous Produc-
tion of Paper and Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1179, Inv. No. 337-TA-82A
(Nov. 1981). This was the first case involving a limited exclusion order. It followed the
Presidential disapproval of the exclusion remedy in the first headboxes case, Certain
Headboxes and Papermaking Machine Forming Sections for the Continuous Produc-
tion of Paper and Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1138, Inv. No. 337-TA-82 (Apr.
1981).
181 Certain Headboxes, USITC Pub. 1138, Inv. No. 337-TA-82 (Apr. 1981).
The President's disapproval is found at 46 Fed. Reg. 32,361 (1981).
182 Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps and Components Thereof, USITC Pub.
1199, Inv. No. 337-TA-90, at 18 (Nov. 1981). Nonetheless, nearly four times as many
general exclusion orders are outstanding as limited exclusion orders (39 to 10). Conver-
sation with Tim Yaworski, Assistant General Counsel for Section 337 Investigations,
International Trade Commission (Dec. 27, 1988).
183 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0(1) (1982).
184 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0(2) (1982). Despite the in rem nature of Section 337 pro-
ceedings, personal jurisdiction over respondents against whom civil penalties were pro-
posed would, of course, be required. Failing such jurisdiction, the Commission could
substitute an exclusion order.
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as remedies for the same or separate Section 337 violations.' 85
7.2. Application to the Energy Trade
Section 337 of the Trade Act of 1974 has not been used to prevent
entry of primary energy imports, although that statement applies with
equal force to the trade laws generally.'8 6 Primary natural resource
products are not subject to patent. However, gasoline and other petro-
leum blends and products are candidates for the protection afforded by
Section 337 to a patented process.'1 7 A fuel additive could be patented,
thereby bringing protection to any blend that contained the additive.
Section 337 could also be used to obtain relief in the case of a counter-
feit trademark that protects a particular petroleum product.
Complaints instituted by the Commission involving energy trade
and Section 337 have been limited to petroleum derivatives.' An in-
triguing complaint which the Commission declined to investigate al-
leged unfair methods of competition in the importation or sale of Mexi-
can anhydrous ammonia, a fertilizer with natural gas as its principal
cost element. The complaint alleged a cost-price squeeze by the Mexi-
can government's petroleum monopoly (PEMEX), which was said to
have conspired with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC) to drive up the cost of natural gas and then undercut
U.S. ammonia producers by selling ammonia for "artificially low
prices."1 9 The Commission's General Counsel viewed the complaint as
185 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (0(1) (1982). See Certain Molded-In Sandwich Panel
Inserts and Methods for Their Installation, USITC Pub. 1246, Inv. No. 337-TA-99
(1982). Paragraph (f)(1) was amended by Section 1342(a)(4) of the 1988 Trade Act,
102 Stat. 1213, explicitly to authorize both remedies even for the same violation. See
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 169, at 636. The same provision increased the max-
imum daily penalty from the greater of $10,000 or the domestic value of the articles
entered or sold in violation to the greater of $100,000 or twice the value of such arti-
cles. Id.
188 Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982),
has a rich history of being used as the basis for restricting importation of petroleum and
petroleum products, but Section 232 is not, of course, a trade law, even though it is
administered by the Department of Commerce. See S. POWELL & V. SLATER, RAMIFI-
CATIONS FOR PETROLEUM IMPORTS OF U.S. TRADE AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAWS
(1988) (proceedings of International Research Center for Energy & Economic Devel-
opment, Boulder, CO, Apr. 7-8, 1988).
187 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982). See Herrington, U.S. International Trade Com-
mission: Imported Articles Made by Patented Process, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 549
(1980) (explaining history of Section 337 in protecting patented processes).
188 A recent example of a complaint involving petroleum derivatives is Certain
Moldable/Extrudable Polyetheresteramide Copolymers, Inv. No. 337-TA-258, slip op.
(July 15, 1987) (terminated by withdrawal of complaint).
18 International Trade Commission General Counsel Op. No. GC-G-022 at 1
(Jan. 21, 1983) [hereinafter ITC/GC Op.] (available in the Agency's law library). A
second count, claiming illegal price discrimination in the sale of natural gas in the
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fatally defective under the antitrust laws for failing to allege that
PEMEX has a monopoly over natural gas or "strategic dominance"
over the pricing of natural gas in the United States.19 It remains to be
seen whether a future complainant can develop a fruitful competition
law theory to reach under Section 337 dual-pricing policies of countries
rich in petroleum resources.
Nothing in the cases mentioned above or in the international trade
of energy indicates that an energy-related good would be subjected to
special treatment under Section 337.
8. CONCLUSION
The continuing growth in energy product imports has caused do-
mestic firms to consider laws that can provide relief from the harmful
effects such imports may cause. Unfair trade laws are among the laws
under consideration. The range of relief available under unfair trade
laws includes increased border duties to offset the effects of dumping or
subsidization, embargoes prohibiting entry of goods infringing the intel-
lectual property rights of U.S. industries, and quotas and other mea-
sures retaliating against unreasonable practices of foreign governments
that remain uncured by negotiation.
This essay has touched upon a number of current issues relevant
to obtaining relief in response to energy imports under the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws, as well as Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974 and Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The article consid-
ered the potential impact of the United States-Canada Free-Trade
Agreement's provision for binational panel review of antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations involving Canadian goods instead of
judicial review because Canada is an important supplier of energy
goods to this country.
These issues will be among the first to surface if the domestic in-
dustry begins to seek relief under the unfair trade laws (as it has, for
example, under the national security clause19 ). The discussion gives
United States at a high price and "natural gas in the form of ammonia" for a very low
price, was dismissed as frivolous because ammonia and natural gas are not items of
"like grade and quality" within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13(a) (1982). ITC/GC Op. at 23. See Atlanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365
(2d Cir. 1958).
-111 ITC/GC Op., supra note 189, at 8-9 (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)).
1'91 On December 1, 1987, an application was filed with the Department of Com-
merce under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982), by a
coalition of independent producers, royalty owners, drilling equipment manufacturers,
and others involved in the domestic petroleum industry. 52 Fed. Reg. 49,059 (1987).
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the authors reason to believe that energy cases will present especially
difficult issues to decisionmakers.
Section 232 authorizes the President to take action to adjust imports if imports threaten
to impair the national security. On January 3, 1989, President Reagan, while agreeing
that oil imports threaten the national security, decided against import adjustments be-
cause such action would, "in the long run, impair rather than enhance the national
security." Letter to the Congress from the President, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 7
(Jan. 3, 1989). Instead, the President urged the Congress to act on a number of recom-
mendations to improve U.S. energy security, including deregulation of natural gas
prices, permitting development of oil reserves of the outer continental shelf and the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and streamlining of nuclear power licensing. Id.
1989]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
